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THE INADEQUATE POLICE PROTECTION OF
BATTERED WIVES: CAN A CITY AND ITS
POLICE BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?
I. Introduction
"Victim stated the first argument started over a pack of cigarettes.
Victim stated accused (her husband) held her against the bathroom
wall by the hair and continued to beat victim with his right hand.
Victim is six months pregnant at this time. Victim stated accused
kept telling victim, 'Bitch, you are going to lose that baby,' and
then accused would beat the victim in the stomach again." '
Wife abuse is a major social and criminal problem in the United
States,2 victimizing at least 1.8 million3 and perhaps as many as six
1. Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 138, 139 (1977) (quoting 4.1 Assaults, Felonious, File #41, complaint
#13626, July 1974, Washtenaw County Sheriff's Dept., Ann Arbor, Mich.) [here-
inafter cited as Eisenberg & Micklow].
2. Wife abuse in the United States has been the focus of many recent books
and reports. See, e.g., M. BORKOWSKI, M. MURCH & V. WALKER, MARITAL VIOL-
ENCE: THE COMMUNITY RESPONSE (1983); L. BOWKER, BEATING WIFE-BEATING (1983);
J. COSTA. ABUSE OF WOMEN: LEGISLATION, REPORTING AND PREVENTION (1983); T.
DAVIDSON, CONJUGAL CRIME: UNDERSTANDING AND CHANGING THE WIFEBEATING
PATTERN (1978); R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES (1979); J.
FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE: A GUIDE TO THE EMOTIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL,
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABUSED WOMAN AND THOSE HELPING HER (1979);
J. GILES-SIMS, WIFE BATTERING: A SYSTEMS THEORY APPROACH (1983); K. HOFELLER,
BATTERED WOMEN, SHATTERED LIVES (1983); LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY IN SPOUSE ABUSE CASES (1980);
L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE (1981); S. MORGAN, CONJUGAL TERRORISM: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COM-
MUNITY TREATMENT MODEL OF WIFE ABUSE (1982); E. OLSON & K. PETERSEN, No
PLACE TO HIDE-WIFE ABUSE: ANATOMY OF A PRIVATE CRIME (1982); M. PAGELOW,
WOMAN-BATTERING: VICTIMS AND THEIR EXPERIENCES (1981); M. ROY, THE ABUSIVE
PARTNER: AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC BATTERING (1982); S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN
AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT (1982); E. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES OF
MALE VIOLENCE (1985); THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN (J. Chapman & M. Gates
ed. 1978); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED
WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1982); C. WILSON, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1981).
a . See Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Pro-
posals for Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 77 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Finesmith]. A 1978 study yielded this estimate. Id.
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million women 4 every year. Until the late nineteenth century, Anglo-
American law afforded the battered wife little or no protection.5
Characteristic of the long-held attitude of American law toward the
battered wife is an 1824 decision by the Supreme Court of Mississippi
that reaffirmed a husband's old common law "right" to physically
discipline his spouse "without being subjected to vexatious prose-
cutions, resulting jn the mutual discredit and shame of all parties
concerned." ' 6 While American law today no longer exempts from
"vexatious prosecutions" for assault and battery a husband who
attacks his wife,7 many jurisdictions still fail to provide adequate
protection for the battered wife, particularly at the basic level of
police response.8
Despite the belief and preference of some people that police respond
to the crime of wife battering by enforcing the law against the wife
batterer, 9 the policy of many jurisdictions is to encourage non-arrest
or mediation by police officers. 0 In one survey it was found that
less than twenty-five percent of the jurisdictions examined require
the full enforcement of the law and the arrest of the wife batterer."1
4. See id. at 77 n.24. A 1983 report estimated this figure. Id. Finesmith defines
wife abuse as violence perpetrated by a man against a woman with whom he has,
or had, an intimate spousal relationship, whether legal or nonlegal. Id. at 76 n.10.
This note follows the Finesmith definition.
5. See Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 1, at 138-39.
6. Bradley v. State, 2 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 158 (1824).
7. See Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN's RTS. L.
REP. 7, 8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Woods]. This is so unless he "simply" rapes
her. "Generally state law does not consider rape of a woman by her husband to
be a criminal act .... Some states explicitly exclude the husband's rape of his
wife in the text of the criminal code .... Other states do so by case law or
common law." Id. at 8 n.7.
8. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 84-101; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
12-22, 91-93 (1982) [hereinafter cited as RULE OF THUMB]. It should be noted that
by no means do the police bear full responsibility for the inadequate protection
of battered wives by law enforcement officials: "Police are reluctant to arrest
abusers and when they do, prosecutors avoid charging them. Courts have also
contributed to underenforcement of the law in domestic violence cases." Finesmith,
supra note 3, at 82 (footnote omitted). However, "[p]olicemen, whose decisions
to respond to victims of crime and to invoke the criminal process largely determine
the extent of law enforcement, pose the first and most critical barrier to access
to the aid of the criminal law." Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused
Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 135, 144 (1977) [footnote omitted]
[hereinafter cited as Legal Remedies].
9. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 75.
10. See id.
11. See id. Those jurisdictions identified in the Finesmith survey as requiring
the full enforcement of the law and the arrest of the wife batterer are: Barstow,
[Vol. XIV
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The typical police response to wife abuse is thus in conflict with
some societal beliefs and preferences and differs sharply from the
police response to other crimes. 2 Not unexpectedly, such police
policies of nonenforcement of the law have often had painful con-
sequences for the battered wife. 3 The testimony of even a few of
these victims makes for chilling reading. 4
Los Angeles, and San Francisco, Cal.; Atlanta, Ga.; Normal, Ill.; Detroit, Mich.;
Dayton, Ohio; Seattle and Spokane, Wash. See id. at 94 n.135. This policy is
generally expressed in police regulations. See id. at 92-94.
12. See id. at 75.
13.
The police stand at the entrance to the justice system, and their actions
often prevent or discourage battered women from pursuing criminal
remedies against their abusers. Left unchecked, spouse abuse generally
increases in severity as time passes, resulting in the victim's death in
many cases. Where police policies and practices are based on misper-
ceptions of domestic violence, officers are unlikely to respond effectively
to battered women's calls for assistance, which perpetuates and reinforces
the patterns of violence.
RULE OF THUMB, supra note 8, at 91.
14. The following are but three examples of many such cases.
A man grabs his wife by the throat and beats her; brandishes a straight razor
and threatens her with it; tears her blouse off her body and gouges her face, neck,
shoulders, and hands with his nails, in full public view. The police arrive but claim
that they can take no action. Since this is a "family matter," she must go to
family court. Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 1049, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976
(Sup. Ct., Special Term, Part 1 1977), rev'd, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165
(1st Dep't 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
A woman suffers a beating at the hands of her husband. The police refuse to
arrest the husband because the parties are married and instead refer them to family
court where they speak with a probation officer. The probation officer insists that
the parties go home and work things out, refusing to let the woman file a petition
for an order of protection and see a judge, even though her husband brags, "She's
my wife and I can do as I please." After the next beating, the woman calls the
probation officer, who merely refers her back to the police, who again refuse to
arrest her husband. Later the husband attacks her again-an assault so severe that
she is beaten into unconsciousness-and once more she calls the police, who again
refuse to arrest her husband and insist that they can take no action until she
obtains an order of protection from family court. Finally, the woman is able to
obtain the order, but her husband violates it by beating her, punching her in the
face, and knocking her to the floor. Badly bruised and in great pain, the woman
calls the police at once and shows them both her order of protection and her
bruises. Ofrce again they refuse to arrest her husband, tell her that she is not hurt,
and recommend that she go back to family court. Complaint at 18-27, Bruno v.
Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct., Special Term, Part 1 1977);
(cited in Woods, supra note 7, at 10 n.21).
A man slaps his wife and strikes .her with a knife. A police officer arrives but
refuses to arrest the husband. Instead, the policeman says to the husband, "Maybe
if I beat my wife, she'd act right too." Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d at 1050, 396
N.Y.S.2d at 977.
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Clearly, the need to compel local police departments to better
protect the abused wife exists in many jurisdictions.' 5 One possible
method would be to launch an intensive campaign of lobbying and
negotiation that would pressure a police department into formally
adopting a more responsible policy, 6 similar to the patrol guidelines
recently adopted by the New York City Police Department, which
mandate arrest in all felony assaults, in all misdemeanors where the
victim wants an arrest, and in all misdemeanors when a crime is
committed in front of the police officer.'" Perhaps a more realistic
means would be to enact legislation that would either recognize explicitly
that wife abuse is as serious a crime as any other type of criminal
assault and should be punished or would mandate, under most cir-
cumstances, the arrest of the abusive husband.' 8 Yet official policies
and existing laws are obviously only good to the extent they are en-
15. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 75.
16. In Chicago, for example, the Chicago Police Department and attorneys
representing battered women were able to negotiate a special order stating that
"calls for services by females who have been the victim[s] of a battery or assault
are not to be considered Domestic Disturbances .... An arrest should be made
or warrant advised, if the preliminary investigation substantiates the allegation."
Woods, supra note 7, at 31 n.156. A similar change in police arrest policy for
married and unmarried battered women was achieved through negotiation by at-
torneys in New Haven, Connecticut. Id. However, it should be noted that both
negotiations followed in the wake of the successful outcome of a New York lawsuit,
Bruno v. Codd. Id.; see infra note 114.
17. See Greer, City Police Have Changed Their Approach to Family Disputes,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1985, at B2, col. 2.
18. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 87-109 for a thorough discussion of such
legislation. Many states have already enacted statutes that provide for warrantless
arrest based on probable cause in domestic violence cases or that impose duties
on law enforcement officials handling disturbance calls. See ALASKA STAT. §§
18.65.510(6)(b), 18.65.520 (1984 & Supp. 1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.3601,
13.3602 (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1510 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 415.606, 901.15 (West Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 709.906 (Supp. 1984);
IDAHO CODE § 19-603 (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 507(a) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 236.11-.12 (West 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.005
(1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 321, tit. 17-A, § 15(l)(A)(5-A), tit. 19, §§
761-70 (Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); MICH.
CoMP. LAW ANN. § 764.15a (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West
Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:10(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-1-7 (1984); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11-.12 (McKinney 1984); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT §§ 155, 168 (McKinney 1983); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 216 (McKinney
1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5OB-i to -7 (1984 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-07.1-06 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.73(A)(6), 2935.03(B)
(Page 1982 & Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.700-.720, 133.055, 133.310
(1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-9 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611 (1984); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03 (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
30-6-1 to -8 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.99.010-.070 (1980 & Supp.
1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.85(4)(b) (West 1985).
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forced. 9 Probably the best way to ensure adequate police protection
of battered wives would be to hold a city, and its police, liable for
failure to meet the prescribed standard.2" In those instances in which
local or state law2' does not provide a sufficiently strong basis upon
which to maintain such a suit, the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment might provide a basis for this action: "No State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.''2
This Note supports holding a city and its police liable under the
equal protection clause for the inadequate police protection of bat-
tered wives.23 It first explores the question of the applicability of
the equal protection clause to wife abuse cases by examining the
clause's historical origin, as well as the gradual broadening of its
legal scope. 24 It then discusses four legal approaches that might be
used to establish equal protection violations in cases claiming in-
adequate police protection of battered wives. 25 This Note proceeds
to analyze, in the context of the equal protection clause, the weak-
nesses and strengths of arguments that have been used in the past
19. See, e.g., Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or. 702, 670 P.2d 137 (1983) (concerning
failure of police to enforce Oregon's strong abuse prevention laws on behalf of
battered wife).
20. However, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, basing its decision
on the district's common law, overturned a lower court decision upholding liability
of the local police department in a case brought by a police officer's battered wife
whose father was killed by her husband. Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468
A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983).
21. Plaintiffs' claims in Bruno v. Codd were based on both local and state
law. "The especially clear-cut nature of these claims, as compared with their federal
counterparts, was an important factor entering into plaintiffs' decision to bring
suit in state court rather than federal court." Woods, supra note 7, at 20-21. The
local and state laws upon which the Bruno plaintiffs decided to base their claims
were: I N.Y.C. Charter & Code § 435(a) (1976); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. pt. 354; 22
N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 2501-10; 22(c) N.Y.C.R.R. pt. 2508; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§
140.10, 140.40(1), (4) (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1978-1979); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT §§ 114, 115, 168, 811, 821 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1978-1979). See
Woods, supra note 7, at 21-25. Principles of comity, federalism, and abstention
also figured in plaintiffs' decision. See id. at 21. In contrast, however, local law
failed to provide a sufficiently strong basis for the claims of the battered wife in
Morgan v. District of Columbia. See supra note 20.
22. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; see infra Sections II-III. For a thorough
discussion and incisive analysis of legal approaches to the problem of wife abuse,
see Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1657 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Marcus].
23. See infra Sections Il-VI.
24. See infra Section II.
25. These four approaches are those that focus on the denial of fundamental
rights, on suspect classes, on impermissible gender-based classifications, and on the
lack of rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See infra section II.
19861
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to justify nonenforcement of the law by police in incidents involving
wife abuse.26 Upon asserting the strength of the equal protection
argument in battered wife cases, this Note then recommends the
approach that has been, and probably will continue to be, the most
receptive approach to the courts.2 7 This Note also stresses the need
for serious judicial consideration of such actions,28 and concludes
by urging serious public -consideration for the concept of using the
courts as a means to compel the police to better protect battered
wives.29
I1. The Applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to Wife
Abuse Cases
It was the refusal of police officers to enforce the law and protect
a certain class of citizens that led to the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause,30 as well as the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 a1 (section 1983). In the years following the Civil War,
law enforcement officials in the South often turned a blind eye to
assaults on blacks by members of the Ku Klux Klan.3 2 As one
contemporary Congressman observed: "Sheriffs, having eyes to see,
see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not .... In the presence
of these gangs all the apparatus and machinery of civil government,
all the processes of justice, skulk away as if government and justice
were crimes and feared detection.""3 The Supreme Court has asserted
that the concern of Congress in passing section 1983 "was not the
unavailability of state remedies but the failure of certain States to
enforce the laws with an equal hand .... There was . .. no quarrel
with the state laws on the books. It was their lack of enforcement
that was the nub of the difficulty. '3 4 Clearly, when the drafters of
the fourteenth amendment wrote that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," 35
they intended their words to be taken literally.
6
26. See infra Section IV.
27. See infra Section V.
28. See id.
29. See infra Section VI.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
32. See Woods, supra note 7, at 18.
33. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 78 (1872) (cited in Woods, supra
note 7, at 18).
34. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174, 176 (1961).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. "The congressional debates on the Civil Rights Act make clear that the
origin and most basic purpose of the 'equal protection' clause are to be found by
[Vol. XIV
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The equal protection clause remains applicable to discriminatory
governmental action in administration and enforcement of the law.37
In addition, police action is subject to the equal protection clause
and to section 1983, whether that action takes the form of committing
prohibited acts or of omitting to carry out acts that a police officer
is required by duty to perform.3" Moreover, although a municipality
may not be held liable for the constitutional torts of its employees
on respondeat superior grounds,39 it may be sued for damages when
the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements an official
policy or unofficial "custom" of the municipality. 0
Originally, the application of the equal protection clause was
limited to cases involving racial classification or racially motivated
discrimination.4  With the passage of time, however, its purview
came to include other classifications. Its authority has since been
invoked to invalidate classifications based on: (1) alienage for the
purpose of distribution of economic benefits that do not promote
a compelling or overriding state interest;42 (2) classifications based
on legitimacy at birth that are not related to a legitimate state
interest;43 (3) classifications based on gender that are not substantially
related to an important governmental objective;"4 and, indeed, (4)
any classification that is not rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose. 45 It is therefore appropriate and proper that the
reference to the literal words of the amendment." Woods, supra note 7, at 18.
37. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Britton v. Rogers,
631 F.2d 572, 577 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981); Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. 400, 409 (N.D.
111. 1980), order rev'd on other grounds, 639 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1981), judgment
rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
38. See, e.g., Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 36-37 (6th Cir. 1973); Byrd v. Brishke,
466 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir. 1972); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1387 (6th Cir.
1972).
39. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978).
40. Id. at 690-91.
41. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) ("We doubt
very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination
against the [N]egroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that
race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application
to any other.").
42. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971).
43. See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456
U.S. 91, 97-99 (1982).
44. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971).
45. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55
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equal protection clause now be invoked to invalidate another dis-
criminatory classification-based partly on gender and partly on
marital status-that denies equal protection of the law and fun-
damental rights to battered wives, 46 bears no substantial relationship
to an important governmental objective, 7 and probably has no
rational relationship to any legitimate governmental purpose. 48 In a
sense, the application of the equal protection clause to the inadequate
police protection of battered wives marks a return to the clause's
historical origin, for there is a striking analogy between the police
failure to enforce the law to protect blacks and the failure of police
to enforce the law to protect battered wives.49
II1. Establishing Equal Protection Violations in
Wife Abuse Cases
Battered wives who bring suit against their city and local police
departments on equal protection grounds must be able to satisfy
certain factual and legal requirements that have been set forth in
Supreme Court decisions. 0 First, plaintiffs must demonstrate through
factual evidence that a policy or pattern of discriminatory police
conduct exists." Second, they must establish, as a matter of law,
that such discriminatory police conduct may be deemed a violation
of the equal protection clause. 2
In a recently decided case, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center," the Supreme Court set forth its current interpretation of
the equal protection clause.5 4 The import of the clause, the Court
reasoned, is to direct that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike. 5 In the absence of congressional guidance, the courts
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972).
46. See infra notes 76-103 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 104-31 and accompanyii, text.
48. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
49. "The analogy between police refusal to enforce the law to protect blacks
and police refusal to protect battered women is clear. It gives powerful support
to the claim that an arrest-avoidance policy denies battered women the equal
protection of the laws." Woods, supra note 7, at 18.
50. See infra notes 51-75 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976).
52. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249,
3254-55 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456
U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
53. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
54. Id. at 3254-55.
55. See id. at 3254; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
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themselves have developed standards for judging the constitutionality
of state statutes or other state actions under the equal protection
clause.16 Generally, courts have sustained legislation "if the classi-
fication drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 5 7 The latitude allowed to the states is especially wide
when a social or economic statute is involved,58 for it is the pre-
sumption of the Constitution that the democratic process will ul-
timately rectify even improvident decisions.5 9
However, there are important exceptions to the general rule. The
Court noted in Cleburne that this principle is not applied when a
statutory classification is based on race, alienage, or national origin. 60
Such factors are rarely pertinent to the attainment of a legitimate
state interest; therefore, laws based on such factors are generally
considered to be reflections of prejudice and bigotry. 61 "For these
reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon
rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict
scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to
serve a compelling state interest." ' 62 Judicial "strict scrutiny" is also
triggered by cases claiming the denial of fundamental rights: "Similar
oversight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on personal
rights protected by the Constitution. '63
Significantly, the Court stated in Cleburne that gender-based leg-
islative classifications "also call for a heightened standard of re-
56. 105 S. Ct. at 3254.
57. Id.; see Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93, 97 (1979); City-of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
58. 105 S. Ct. at 3254; see United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. at 175 ("In ... recent years, . . . the Court in cases involving social and
economic benefits has consistently refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds
legislation which it simply deemed unwise or unartfully drawn."); City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303-04 ("When local economic regulation is challenged
solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to
legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discrimina-
tions .... States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies
under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially
less than mathematical exactitude .... [Iun the local economic sphere, it is only
the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment.").
59. See 105 S. Ct. at 3254.
60. Id. at 3255.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
63. 105 S. Ct. at 3255; see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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view. . . . 'W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses
as intelligence or physical disability .. . is that the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society.' "'6 Laws that discriminate between the sexes in the distri-
bution of benefits and burdens most likely depend not on legitimate
factors but rather on "outmoded notions of the relative capabilities
of men and women." ' 65 While the judicial standard Used is not that
of strict scrutiny, a classification based on gender must fail unless
it bears a substantial relationship to a "sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest. "66
Another suspect classification, official discrimination based on
illegitimacy, has become the subject of "somewhat heightened re-
view." ' 67 The Court, however, has refused to recognize either the
aged6 or the mentally retarded 69 as a suspect class. 70 The Court has
held that in these kinds of cases, the equal protection clause only
64. 105 S. Ct. at 3255 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973) (plurality opinion)).
65. Id.
66. Id.; see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-25 (1982);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). The Court has defined its heightened
standard of review for gender-based classifications in this way:
Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based clas-
sification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care must be
taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic
and stereotypic notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or
"protect" members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer
from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself
is illegitimate....
If the State's objective is legitimate and important, we next determine
whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective
and means is present. The purpose of requiring that close relationship
is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through
reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men
and women. The need for the requirement is amply revealed by reference
to the broad range of statutes already invalidated by this Court, statutes
that relied upon the simplistic, outdated assumption that gender could
be used as a "proxy for other, more germane bases of classification,"
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976), to establish a link between
objective and classification.
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-26 (footnotes omitted).
67. 105 S. Ct. at 3255; see Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976).
68. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
69. 105 S. Ct. at 3255-58.
70. Thus, these groups are not protected through strict or heightened review.
See id. at 3255.
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requires that the classification be "a rational means to serve a
legitimate end." 7'
Thus, there are four possible grounds upon which a battered wife
could base a suit to challenge a city and its police under the equal
protection clause. She could allege that a policy or pattern of
inadequate police protection exists that is: (1) an infringement of a
fundamental right and is not suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest; 72 (2) directed at a truly suspect class; 73 (3) directed
against women and is not substantially related to a sufficiently
important governmental interest;74 and/or (4) not rationally related
to any legitimate state interest.75
A. Fundamental Rights
The strongest approach a battered wife can take is to successfully
prove to the court that the rights being denied her are fundamental. 76
Once this view of the law is accepted, the defendants' behavior
becomes subject to strict judicial scrutiny and will be ruled uncon-
stitutional unless it is suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest . 77
Thus, a battered wife might argue that by being denied access to
police protection, she has been deprived of a fundamental right. 78
However, it must also be noted that thus far the Supreme Court
has not characterized such access as a fundamental right.79 This may
well be a matter of historical accident; the Supreme Court has had
occasion to reject the claim of a constitutional right to compensation
with regard to a particular failure to provide police protection,8 ° but
the Court has never dealt with the issue of the denial of police
protection on the basis of a broad classification.8 It should be
recalled in this context that in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 2 where appellees raised the issue of the right
to education, the Court raised the possibility that had the appellees
71. Id.
72. See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 104-31 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
78. See Marcus, supra note 22, at 1666.
79. See id.
80. See YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
81. See Marcus, supra note 22, at 1666.
82. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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shown "an absolute denial of educational opportunities," the Court
might have found an interference with fundamental rights.83 Con-
sequently, a case involving the complete or near-complete denial of
police protection to battered wives could well move a court to find
the deprivation of a fundamental right.8 4 Until such a claim actually
comes before a court, however, the argument will remain simply a
promising theory.
A battered wife might also maintain that the denial of access to
the courts-through the refusal of police to take legal action against
the battering husband-constitutes the violation of a fundamental
right.85 This approach also is problematic. While such a right of
access has been recognized in civil cases where only a judicial
proceeding can effectively resolve a dispute,8 6 the right has thus far
been limited in criminal cases to ensuring only that basic trial and
appellate procedures do not discriminate against certain classes of
defendants .8
Certainly an argument for a more expansive application of the
right to court access can be made in criminal cases involving wife
abuse. It could well be argued that for battered wives seeking to
press criminal charges against their battering husbands-just as in
civil cases where a judicial proceeding is the only effective means
of dispute resolution-resort to the judicial process is, practically
speaking, no more voluntary than it is for defendants called upon
to defend their interests in court. For both groups the court is more
than the best forum for the settlement of their disputes-it is the
only available one. As persons forced to settle their claims of right
through the judicial process, battered wives should be given a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard under basic due process principles. 8
The argument is an attractive one, but until it is actually raised in
court, it too must remain no more than a promising theory.
There is one more argument that deserves to be considered on
behalf of the proposition that a battered wife being denied adequate
police protection is being deprived of a fundamental right:
83. See id. at 36-37; Marcus, supra note 22, at 1666 n.37.
84. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37
(analogous denial of education).
85. See Marcus, supra note 22, at 1666.
86. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971); Marcus, supra note
22, at 1666-67.
87. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); Marcus, supra note 22, at
1667.
88. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 376-77.
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[lit is anomalous to conclude that governmental services vital to
our physical security should be put into the same category as
granting a driver's license. Blackstone's classic analysis of the
rights of individuals gave the highest priority to protection from
murder or mutilation and "security from the corporal insults of
menaces, assaults, beating and wounding." 9
B. Suspect Class
Another possible approach that one might take would be to present
the battered wife as a member of a suspect class. This approach
would justify the invocation by the court of a standard of strict,
or at least heightened, judicial scrutiny. 9° A plaintiff would have to
show that battered wives, as a class, possess "the traditional indicia
of suspectness," 9' i.e., battered wives are "saddled with such dis-
abilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." 
One could argue that each of these indicia is present in the class
of battered wives, for they have suffered not only the physical abuse
of their husbands, but also the neglect of law enforcement personnel
due to traditional stereotypes and prejudices, 9 and have been pow-
erless to protect themselves. 94 But this argument, despite its merits,
may have been undermined by the Supreme Court's decisions in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia95 and, more recently,
in Cleburne.96
89. Marcus, supra note 22, at 1667 (quoting I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*134) (footnote omitted).
90. See supra notes 60-62, 64-67 and accompanying text.
91. San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
92. Id. For cases in which the Court recognized a class as suspect based on
the burden of disabilities of the class, its history of suffering deliberate unequal
treatment, and its position of political powerlessness, see Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976) (illegitimacy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (gender);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin)
93. See infra notes 135-45 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that
classifications that are probably based on stereotypes should be treated with special
suspicion. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 933 (1973).
94. See Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 1, at 141-45.
95. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
96. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
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In Murgia, the Court declined to recognize a suspect class based
on age. While the Court acknowledged that there has been discrim-
ination against the aged, the Court also found that the aged have
not experienced a " 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' " like
that suffered by those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, nor have the aged been subjected
to special disabilities based on stereotypes not truly indicative of
their disabilities. 97
Similarly, in Cleburne, the Court held that the mentally retarded
do not constitute a suspect class. While recognizing that the mentally
retarded have been, and will continue to be, the victims of "in-
stances" of invidious discrimination, 98 the Court noted that there
are legitimate reasons for the government to single out the mentally
retarded for special treatment. 99 Moreover, the Court declared, the
distinctive and sympathetic legislative response to the plight of the
mentally retarded contradicts the allegation that the mentally retarded
are politically powerless, for they have the ability to attract the
attention of the legislators.' °° The Court also evinced a strong re-
luctance to enlarge the category of the suspect class:
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were
deemed quasi-suspect .... it would be difficult to find a principled
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps
immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot
themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can
claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public
at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the
disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set
out on that course, and we decline to do so.' 0 '
One can, of course, distinguish between battered wives and the
mentally retarded, "the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and
the infirm." One can maintain that the disabilities and historical
maltreatment suffered by battered wives are very much like those
suffered by persons on the basis of race or national origin,10 2 and
that the legislative response to the plight of the battered wife has
97. 427 U.S. at 313.
98. 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
99. Id. at 3256-57.
100. See id. at 3257.
101. Id. at 3257-58.
102. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text. As with persons persecuted
on the basis of race or national origin, battered wives historically have been subjected
to physical violence that they generally have been powerless to resist and that the
authorities generally have been reluctant to punish and prevent.
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been of limited effectiveness due to nonenforcement. °3 Nonetheless,
in view of Murgia and Cleburne and the Supreme Court's hesitation
to recognize new suspect classes, a plaintiff would be wise to use
the approach of the suspect class only as a supplement to another
approach.
C. Gender-Based Classification
It is logical to assume from Cleburne'0 4 and cases cited therein'05
that when a court is convinced that a policy or pattern of inadequate
police protection of battered wives results from an impermissible
gender-based classification, it will subject the defendants' actions to
an intermediate, but still searching, level of judicial scrutiny.' °6 This
was the approach taken in Thurman v. City of Torrington,"°" a
seminal case in its application of the equal protection clause to the
claim of inadequate police protection of abused wives. In Thurman,
the court viewed the alleged behavior of the defendant city andpolice officers as a clear consequence of a sex-based classification.
"If the City wishes to discriminate against women who are victims
of domestic violence," wrote the court, "it must articulate an im-
portant governmental interest for doing so."108
Recalling the old common law " 'right of husbands to physically
discipline their wives,' "09 the Thurman court deemed any present-
day version of this concept "an 'increasingly outdated misconcep-
tion,' ,, '0 which must be rejected as unconstitutional.' The court
103. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
104. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
105. Id. at 3255 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
106. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
107. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). In Thurman v. City of Torrington,
a woman and her son brought a civil rights action against the City of Torrington,
Conn., and its police officers, alleging that plaintiffs' constitutional rights were
violated by the police officers' malperformance of official duties with regard to
assaults committed by the woman's husband. On the City's motion to dismiss the
complaint, the court held that plaintiffs stated a violation of the equal protection
clause (thus precluding dismissal of the complaint) where they alleged that the
police consistently and systematically provided substandard protection to victims
of domestic violence. Id. at 1527.
108. Id. at 1527.
109. Id. at 1528 (quoting Finesmith, supra note 3, at 79).
110. Id. (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 198-99).
111.
As such it must join other "archaic and overbroad" premises which
have been rejected as unconstitutional. Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d
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observed that "[a] man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger
a woman merely because he is her husband.""12 Citing Bruno v.
Codd,"3 another important wife abuse case," 4 the Thurman court
extended this principle to the duty of the police and ruled that
concomitantly, "a police officer may not knowingly refrain from
interference in such violence, and may not 'automatically decline to
make an arrest [solely] because the assaulter and his victim are
married to each other.' "I" The court labeled such police inaction
"a denial of the equal protection of the laws." '" 16 In response to
the familiar policy of discouraging police intervention in intrafamily
disputes,"17 the Thurman court quoted the Supreme Court's dictum
in Reed v. Reed"' that " 'whatever may be said as to the positive
values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice in this context
may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.' ""9
1114 (2d Cir. 1976) (rejecting the notion that pregnancy renders ser-
vicewomen unfit and requires discharge); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 643, 95 S. Ct. 1225, 1230, 43 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1975) (rejecting
proposition that the earnings of female wage earners do not significantly
contribute to their families' support); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 689, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1771, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1973) (rejecting
assertion that female spouses of servicemen would normally be dependent
upon their husbands while male spouses of servicewomen would not be
dependent upon their wives); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15, 95
S. Ct. 1373, 1377-1378, 43 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1975) (rejecting "old notion"
that the female is destined solely for the home and the rearing of the
family and the male only for the marketplace and the world of ideas).
Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1528.
112. Id.
113. 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct., Special Term, Part 1 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dep't 1978), aff'd,
47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
114. In Bruno v. Codd, twelve battered wives in New York City, suing on behalf
of themselves and all other battered wives similarly situated, alleged that the New
York City Police Department, the New York City Department of Probation, and
the clerks of the New York Family Court engaged in a pervasive pattern and
practice of denying abused wives the legal protection and assistance to which they
were entitled under city and state law. For a detailed discussion of this pineering
case by one of the plaintiffs' attorneys, see Woods, supra note 7, at 15-33.
115. 595 F. Supp. at 1528 (quoting Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d at 1049, 396
N.Y.S.2d at 976).
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
118. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
119. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1529 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-
77). The Thurman court also noted:
any notion that defendants' practice can be justified as a means of
promoting domestic harmony by refraining from interference in marital
disputes, has no place in the case at hand. Rather than evidencing a
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In view of Craig v. Boren,'20 Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan,'2' and, most recently, Cleburne,'2 2 it is reasonable to
assume that the approach used in Thurman-of challenging the
inadequate police protection of battered wives as the result of an
impermissible gender-based classification-is a very sound one. It is
important to remember, however, that the intermediate standard of
review applied by the Supreme Court in gender discrimination cases
has often had an uncertain, even "ad hoc" quality about it. 23 The
Court has upheld gender-based classifications when it believed that
the classification reasonably advanced a significant state interest.' 4
Thus, the Court has upheld differentiations between the rights of
mothers and fathers of illegitimate children to bring a wrongful
death action;' 25 a statutory rape law that punished only adult men;'2 6
the exemption of women from military draft registration;' 27 and the
exclusion from employee benefits of insurance payments for costs
related to pregnancy. 28 Even in Mississippi University for Women,
the Court was unwilling to take a stand against the dispensation of
educational benefits on the basis of gender.' 29
Nonetheless, the necessity of showing a substantial relationship to
a sufficiently important government interest remains the Supreme
Court's standard of review for gender-based classifications. 0 As
long as battered wives who use the gender-based classification ap-
proach come prepared to rebut attempts to show that such a re-
lationship exists,' 3' the approach will remain a highly effective one.
desire to work out her problems with her husband privately, [plaintiff]
pleaded with the police to offer her at least some measure of protection.
Further, she sought and received a restraining order to keep her husband
at a distance.
Id. (footnote omitted).
120. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
121. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
122. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
123. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 713-31 (2d
ed. 1983).
124. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
125. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
126. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
127. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
128. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1982). /
129. 458 U.S. at 723 n.7.
130. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 138-67 and accompanying text.
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D. Lack of Rational Relationship
Even the least stringent level of judicial scrutiny under the equal
protection clause would require that any police policy or pattern of
conduct that denies equal protection of the law to battered wives
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state goal. '32 Professor
Tribe has explained this basic requirement of minimum rationality,
pointing out that the Supreme Court has always perceived in the
equal protection clause a requirement that legislative and adminis-
trative classifications be reasonable. The Court has tested this "ra-
tionality" by the classification's ability to fulfill the purpose intended
by the rule. 33 In addition, the purpose of the rule must be a legitimate
one based on some conception of the public good. 34 However,
requiring the existence of a rational relationship to a legitimate state
goal has not led to a careful scrutiny of public purposes. Instead,
courts have traditionally shown a great deal of deference to the
legislative definition of "the general good," whether out of sympathy
for the difficulties of the legislative process or out of a general
belief in judicial restraint. "
Because of this judicial policy of leniency in examining legislative
purposes, a battered wife seeking to prove a violation of the equal
protection clause would be wise to argue lack of rational relationship
in conjunction with other arguments, lest a deferential court manage
to find some "rationality" in a police department's policy of non-
enforcement of the law with regard to battered wives. However, a
strong argument may be made that no rationality can ever be found
for such a policy, at least in a large number of wife abuse cases. 36
Moreover, it is important to note that if a policy of arrest-avoidance
is unwritten, or written only in the police department's administrative
documents, the claim of a legitimate state interest is weakened
considerably, for the defendants would be unable to cite any piece
of state legislation in justification of the policy.' 37
IV. Attempts to Justify Police Nonenforcement Policies in
Wife Abuse Cases
Is it possible to show some justification for a police department's
policy of nonenforcement of the law in wife abuse cases? Repeated
132. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
133. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 994-95 (1978).
134. Id. at 995.
135. See id.; supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 149-67 and accompanying text.
137. See Woods, supra note 7, at 19.
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attempts to do so certainly have been made.' 5 The many ration-
alizations include preserving the traditional "principle" that "a man's
home is his castle;"' 3 9 avoiding arrest in situations in which the
physical abuse of a woman by her husband is purported to be
acceptable within the couple's culture; 40 and maintaining the efficient
and economic administration of the state'slaw enforcement agencies
by regarding wife battering as a minor crime and the arrest of wife
batterers as a low priority.' 4' Other rationalizations have been: (1)
avoiding arrest in a class of cases that is alleged to have a high
complainant attrition rate; 142 (2) avoiding arrest in situations in which
the family could ill afford the economic impact of the husband's
arrest (e.g., time lost from work); 43 (3) respecting a couple's privacy
by not interfering in private marital matters;' 44 and (4) preventing
the possibility of harm to police officers who might be injured in
attempting to arrest a violent husband.' 45 Further attempts at jus-
tification include preventing the possibility of severe retaliation against
the battered wife by the arrested husband after his release; 46 avoiding
arrest in situations in which the battered wife merely wants to frighten
the husband, remove him from the home, or be transported to the
hospital; 47 and preserving the marriage and family, which could be
endangered by the intervention of the criminal justice process. 148
None of these policies can truly justify nonenforcement of the
law by police departments in wife abuse cases. Few of these ex-
planations would be a valid reason for a police officer's failure to
arrest an assailant if the assault were committed by a stranger. 4 9
138. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 85-86; Parnas, The Police Response to the
Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 914, 930-31 [hereinafter cited as Parnas];
Woods, supra note 7, at 19; Legal Remedies, supra note 8, at 169.
139. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 86; Marcus, supra note 22, at 1660; Parnas,
supra note 138, at 931.
140. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 85; Parnas, supra note 138, at 930.
141. See Legal Remedies, supra note 8, at 169.
142. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 86; Marcus, supra note 22, at 1673; Parnas,
supra note 138, at 931; Woods, supra note 7, at 19.
143. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 85; Marcus, supra note 22, at 1670; Parnas,
supra note 138, at 930.
144. See Marcus, supra note 22, at 1660; Legal Remedies, supra note 8, at 169.
145. See Marcus, supra note 22, at 1671; Woods, supra note 7, at 19; Legal
Remedies, supra note 8, at 169.
146. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 85; Parnas, supra note 135, at 931; Legal
Remedies, supra note 8, at 169.
147. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 85; Parnas, supra note 135, at 930.
148. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 85-86; Marcus, supra note 22, at 1669;
Parnas, supra note 138, at 931; Woods, supra note 7, at 19; Legal Remedies,
supra note 8, at 169.
149. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 86.
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Most of these justifications can be quickly dismissed. Any "prin-
ciple," no matter how hoary with antiquity, that permits, for any
reason, a woman to be physically abused by a man, simply because
they are married to one another, is unacceptable morally, legally,
and constitutionally.' ° The same may be said of any "cultural
tradition" that allegedly condones wife abuse, a rationalization that
smacks of prejudice and may, under certain circumstances, trigger
the strict judicial scrutiny appropriate to cases involving racial clas-
sifications.' It is highly unlikely that a court would openly and
officially accept a policy that ignores the crime of wife beating in
order to save the state some time and money.' It has not been
proven that there is a higher complainant attrition rate in wife
battering cases than in other cases involving violence between
acquaintances"' and, in any event, an arrest serves the independent
function of protecting the victim from immediate future harm-
protection that is crucial for a victim as helpless as a battered wife.' 54
There is no reason that the economic impact of an arrest on an
assailant's family should figure more prominently in a wife battering
case than in an ordinary assault case.'" A crime committed by one
spouse against the other can hardly be deemed a matter of marital
privacy. 56 Moreover, if one accepts the argument that a police officer
ought not attempt to arrest a wife batterer lest his action place him
in danger, one should logically bar a police officer from all duties
that might place him in danger.'5 7
150. See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. at 1528.
151. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; Finesmith, supra note 3, at
86.
152. Cf. Legal Remedies, supra note 8, at 169-70 (arguing that "the state's
interest in the life, liberty, and safety of abused women is far more substantial"
than such considerations as saving the state some time and money).
153. See Woods, supra note 7, at 20. Moreover, "in some of the jurisdictions
where prosecutors have treated interspousal attacks as crimes against the state and
were firm in pursuing them, the complaining witnesses cooperated in more than
ninety percent of the cases where charges were filed." Marcus, supra note 22, at
1680 (footnote omitted).
154. See Woods, supra note 7, at 20.
155. See Finesmith, supra note 3, at 85-86; Marcus, supra note 22, at 1671.
156. See Marcus, supra note 22, at 1661-63, 1668-70; Legal Remedies, supra note
8, at 169.
157.
I1f it is true that the rate of police injuries in domestic assault cases
is high, that problem can be addressed by special police training programs.
It is hardly a justification to refuse to protect defenseless women from
husbands who are usually stronger than they are, to claim that domestic




The attempted justification of preventing the possibility of severe
retaliation against the battered wife by the arrested husband after
his release is worthy of more attention. However, this remains a
highly dubious rationalization for several reasons. First, the possi-
bility of retaliation may be precluded altogether if there exist local
shelters for battered wives, or other means for the victimized woman
to leave her home once her husband has been arrested."' If such
is the situation, this attempted justification vanishes entirely. Second,
an abusive husband whose wife has unsuccessfully tried to have him
arrested may well be at least as likely to retaliate as is an abusive
husband who has actually been arrested.'5 9 Indeed, he is perhaps
more likely to retaliate, for the police officer's refusal to arrest him
may lead the abusive husband to believe-not without cause-that
he may retaliate with impunity. 160 Third, it can be strongly argued
that the arrest of abusive husbands overwhelmingly serves to dis-
courage the crime of wife battering rather than to promote retal-
iation.' 6' As one expert in the area of wife abuse cases has observed:
Since the concomitant results of arrest (e.g., publicity, embar-
rassment, and loss of time from work) are generally difficult and
unpleasant, certainty of arrest following spouse abuse may perform
a deterrent function. In fact, arrest may be even more effective
in the marital violence context than in others, as most battering
men probably do not view themselves as habitual criminals for
whom arrest is an expected event. Rather, they are likely to see
themselves as law-abiding citizens for whom arrest is unusual and
frightening. For that reason, it is possible that arrest is more
likely to affect their views of themselves and hence, their sub-
sequent behavior. 62
Woods, supra note 7, at 20; see also Marcus, supra note 22, at 1672-73 (footnotes
omitted) ("While reduction of risk to police personnel must be a continuing
governmental objective, it cannot be accomplished merely by writing off one group
of victims as too undeserving to warrant such a risk. Rather, the state should
provide well-designed training programs to assist officers in utilizing crisis prevention
techniques and distinguishing between those cases necessitating only mediation and
those requiring investigation and arrest."); Legal Remedies, supra note 8, at 169
(footnote omitted) ("By training police officers to handle violent situations which
involve people who know or are married to each other, harm to police officers
would be reduced without penalizing this class of female assault victims").
158. See RULE OF THUMB, supra note 8, at 96.
159. See Woods, supra note 7, at 12-13.
160. See id.
161. See id.; Finesmith, supra note 3, at 102-05.
162. Finesmith, supra note 3, at 104. The argument that arrest serves to discourage
wife abuse rather than promote retaliation is supported by a study conducted in
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Situations in which the battered wife merely wants to frighten the
husband, remove him from the home, or be transported to the
hospital, are unique situations that properly call for the use of the
police officer's discretion. 63 They are completely removed from sit-
uations in which a battered wife fully desires and expressly requests
her abusive husband's arrest.164 An oft-cited attempt at justification
for avoiding the arrest of wife batterers is the preservation of the
marriage and family. 165 However, the violence may have already
destroyed the marriage and irrevocably torn apart the family.
66 If
such is the situation, then the attempted justification does not exist
at all. In other situations, it is wise to consider the response of an
attorney who has for years been a leader in the struggle for the
legal rights of the battered wife:
[Elven if the arrest-avoidance policy actually furthers that goal,
[it] is simply an insufficient justification for allowing women to
suffer injuries at the hands of their violent husbands. Less drastic
alternatives are available to preserve the family after the arrest
and removal of the assailant. Moreover, it can certainly be argued
that the family is best preserved not by avoidance of arrest but
rather by arrest: that women are forced to leave their husbands
because the law of law enforcement leaves the women no alter-
native, while arrest might lead to the cessation of the violence,
with the result of the family staying together. Finally, there should
not be any state interest in preserving a family which is a haven
for unchecked violence.
67
Minneapolis during 1982 by the Police Foundation. An executive summary of the
study's preliminary experimental findings stated that "arrested subjects [battering
spouses] manifested significantly less violence [e.g., recidivism] than those who were
ordered to leave [the scene of the violence], and less violence than those who were
advised [e.g., counseled] but not separated." Id. at 101 n.174 (quoting L. SHERMAN
& R. BERK, POLICE RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC ASSAULT: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (AN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 1 (1983)). Such findings buttress the theory that the arrest
of wife batterers generally discourages continued violence against battered wives,
whether of a retaliatory or nonretaliatory nature.
163. "[lIt might be appropriate to honor a battered woman's request to have
an abuser removed from the house without filing charges .... ." Finesmith, supra
note 3, at 86.
164. See supra note 119.
165. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
166. See Legal Remedies, supra note 8, at 169; cf. Marcus, supra note 22, at
1669 (footnote omitted) ("The argument that the state cannot protect a domestic
assault victim because of the sanctity of marriage is uncomfortably reminiscent of
the plea of the patricide that he should be exempt from prosecution because he
is an orphan. It is the violence, not the cessation of violence, which threatens the
family.").




It is clear that there are strong grounds upon which a city and
its police may be held liable under the equal protection clause for
the inadequate police protection of battered wives. 168 Plaintiffs would
have a variety of potentially successful approaches from which to
choose, ranging from the claim of the denial of fundamental rights,
which could trigger strict judicial scrutiny, 69 to the contention of
a suspect class, which could invoke strict, or at least heightened,
scrutiny, 70 to the allegation of an impermissible gender-based clas-
sification, with its intermediate level of judicial scrutiny, 7' to the
argument that inadequate police protection lacks a rational rela-
tionship to any legitimate state purpose.172
Any good legal strategy would incorporate elements of all four
approaches, for, to paraphrase the Bible, a fourfold cord is not
quickly broken. 7 ' The best strategy, however, would focus on the
allegation of an impermissible gender-based classification. This was
the approach that proved to be successful in the seminal inadequate
protection case of Thurman v. City of Torrington'74 and probably
will continue to be successful in court. It is easy to see why. Such
an approach does not call upon a court to find a fundamental right
has been denied,'75 nor to recognize a new suspect class, 7 6 nor to
rule out entirely any possibility of rationality.'7 7 This approach simply
asks the court to acknowledge what few in modern society would
dispute: that the inadequate police protection of battered wives is
a classification based on gender that does not bear a substantial
relationship to a sufficiently important governmental interest.'78
168. See supra Section III.
169. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 104-31 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
173. See Ecclesiastes 4:12.
174. See supra notes 107-19 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential
problems of using a fundamental rights approach. It is worth noting that the
Thurman court, although a trailblazer in many ways, did not raise the possibility
that the rights denied plaintiff were fundamental. See Thurman v. City of Tor-
rington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
176. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text for evidence of the Supreme
Court's reluctance to recognize new suspect classes.
177. See supra notes 56-59, 135 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
traditional judicial reluctance to find legislation or administrative procedures devoid
of any rational purpose.
178. See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. at 1527-29; supra notes
107-31 and accompanying text.
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However the issue is presented, there exists the need for serious
judicial consideration of actions that challenge the inadequate police
protection of abused wives. Given the heavy social17 9 and legal'8 0
significance of such actions, it is reasonable to assume that many
courts will follow the lead of Thurman and accept these claims.
VI. Conclusion
The concept of using the equal protection clause to hold a city
and its police liable for the inadequate police protection of battered
wives is very new. To date it has been employed in only one case.
Yet, the success of this concept in Thurman, and the strengths of
its four bases, augur well for its future application. Battered wives
and their advocates should seriously consider using the equal pro-
tection clause as a means of compelling the local authorities to
provide them with the police protection that every citizen deserves.
Jeffrey A. Shapiro
179. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 5-22 and accompanying text.
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